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Abstract 
The Greek author Lucian of Samosata (120 – 192 AD) has long remained an enigmatic 
figure for scholars of the Second Sophistic.This is due, in no small part, to his 
conflicting, satirical treatment of the two main cultural institutions of his day, the art of 
rhetoric and the practice of philosophy.Yet though he satirizes both of these in equal 
measure, upon more careful scrutiny it becomes clear that the underlying motivation 
for his critique of each stems from different emotional centers.  It is the contention of 
the present paper that while Lucian’s critique of rhetoric is best understood as based on 
a deep respect and reverence for eloquence, combined with a concomitant disgust for 
unworthy, contemporary representatives of it, on the other hand,his motivation for 
satirizing philosophy appears to be simply the fact that Lucian cared little for, and 
thought little of the subject(despite his objections to the contrary), and that he 
preferred instead the uncomplicated principles of common sense and practical virtue. 
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Introduction 
Nearly thirty years ago, American scholar Bracht Branham observed that second 
century AD sophist Lucian of Samosata “remains one of the most curiously elusive of 
ancient authors, and his standing in the classical canon uncertain” (Branham, 1989, p. 
11). Despite the passage of time, a marked increase in interest regarding the Second 
Sophistic in general, and the publishing of a great many valuable studies on Lucian in 
particular, this assessment is still essentially true, and it remains so in large part 
because of certain, central paradoxes within Lucian's owncorpus. Chief among these is 
his conflicting, satirical treatment of two of the main cultural institutions of his day, 
the art of rhetoric and the practice of philosophy. Within his satires against these two 
pillars of Greek paideia, that impossible to translate word signifying culture, 
eloquence, learning, values, and tastes (Marrou, 1956, pp. 95-101; Bompaire, 1958, p. 
124) lie a vast tangle of seeming contradictions.In some texts, Lucian quite happily 
scoffs at religious beliefs or magic by making philosophy their defender and 
representative, while in other texts he attacks individual philosophers for their impiety 
(Whitmarsh, 2015, p. 222).  Likewise, whenever ridiculing the vices of venality, or, 
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especially, hypocrisy, he usually depicts their embodiment in the philosophers 
themselves (Baldwin, 1961, pp. 199-203; Baldwin, 1973, p. 32; Jones, 1986, p. 
24).The same is true for the flummery of rhetoricians, whose extravagance and 
chicanery disillusioned him so much that he decided,or at least professed in multiple 
dialogues, to abandon the practice of rhetoric altogether — though, ironically enough, 
so as to devote himself more wholly to the pursuit of philosophy (Bis Acc. 32-4; Pisc. 
19, 25-7; Herm. 13; Clay, 1992, p.3408). 
Yet in analyzing the critique which Lucian made of contemporary rhetorical and 
philosophical paideia, a clear distinction becomes apparent. This is not to repeat the 
well-worn and simplistic view that Lucian merely followed the Second Sophistic trend 
of subordinating philosophy to rhetoric (Schlapbach, 2010, p. 250). Nor is it a 
distinction between the ways in which he executes his satire of these two institutions. 
Rather, it is a distinction between the stimulus which appears to underlie his critique of 
each. On the one hand, his mordant wit and merciless caricaturing of individual types 
are dealt in equal measure to both sophists and philosophers alike, but, on the other 
hand, upon more careful scrutiny, and when viewing this subject throughout the 
totality of his corpus, one can see that the motivation for these two, different targets of 
satire derive from two emotionally opposite sources. In the case of rhetoric, Lucian's 
satire appears to be based on deep respect and reverence for eloquence, combined with 
a concomitant disgust for unworthy, contemporary representatives of it. Conversely, 
his motivation for satirizing philosophy appears to be simply the fact that Lucian, for 
all intents and purposes, cared little for, and thought little of, the subject in general, 
despite his objections to the contrary, as we shall see, and that instead he preferred the 
uncomplicated principles of common sense and practical virtue.  
Rhetorical Paideia 
Beginning first with rhetoric, we see that Lucian’s love of the oratorical art, and the 
exaltation in which he held it, are clearly illustrated in the Somnium.This is a piece 
most probably delivered upon his return to Samosata in 164 AD after touring the 
greater part of the Roman Empire for many years and reaping the benefits of his 
successful career in rhetoric.  Here, he makes use of a favored metaphor of his for 
describing achievement in rhetoric, that of being high up, above others.  For with 
Paideia as his companion, he ascended over the common people and nations,“was 
carried up into the heights and went from the East unto the uttermost West, surveying 
cities and nations and peoples, disseminating something like Triptolemus over the 
earth” (Somn. 15). Among the gifts of Paideia, Lucian states that he was shown the 
many works of men of old, was told their wondrous words and deeds, was made 
conversant with almost all knowledge, and was adorned in soul with what concerned 
him most. This last are the many noble attributes of temperance, justice, piety, 
kindliness, reasonableness, understanding, steadfastness, love of all that is beautiful, 
and ardor towards all that is sublime. In short, it is a knowledge of all things human 
and divine (Somn. 10).  This is high praise indeed, especially since it comes in a work 
that is ostensibly autobiographical.To be sure, the larger narrative framework of the 
piece, based upon a revelation in a dream and a conversion of his life path, is unlikely 
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to be literally true (Hopkinson, 2008, p. 1).1 The work, rather, is “true in a deeper 
sense, as providing an aetiological myth for the rhetorical success and social prestige 
of its narrator, who presents himself as a Heracles or Socrates for the modern age, a 
devotee of culture and higher education in spite of difficult odds, [and] a rhetorical 
performer who has carved for himself a prominent niche in the pantheon of 
contemporary intellectuals” (Hopkinson, 2008, p. 95). 
We get a similar intimation of the high value Lucian placed on rhetoric in the dialogue 
Bis Accusatus, written after Lucian's professed conversion from rhetoric to philosophy, 
wherein Lady Rhetoric sues Lucian for abandoning her. Here his relationship with 
rhetoric is described as being a once happy and faithful marriage.Lady Rhetoric says in 
her speech, for instance: 
ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τουτονὶ κομιδῇ μειράκιον ὄντα, βάρβαρον ἔτι 
τὴν φωνὴν καὶ μονονουχὶ κάνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα εἰς τὸν Ἀσσύριον τρόπον, περὶ 
τὴν Ἰωνίαν εὑροῦσα πλαζόμενον ἔτι καὶ ὅ τι χρήσαιτο ἑαυτῷ οὐκ εἰδότα 
παραλαβοῦσα ἐπαίδευσα. καὶ ἐπειδὴἐδόκει μοι εὐμαθὴς εἶναι καὶ ἀτενὲς ὁρᾶν 
εἰς ἐμὲ — ὑπέπτησσε γὰρ τότε καὶ ἐθεράπευεν. καὶ μόνην ἐθαύμαζεν, 
ἀπολιποῦσα τοὺς ἄλλους ὁπόσοι ἐμνήστευόν με πλούσιοι καὶ καλοὶ καὶ 
λαμπροὶ τὰ προγονικά, τῷ ἀχαρίστῳ τούτῳ ἐμαυτὴν ἐνεγγύησα πένητι 
καὶἀφανεῖ καὶ νέῳ προῖκα οὐ μικρὰν ἐπενεγκαμένη πολλοὺς καὶ θαυμασίους 
λόγους. εἶτα ἀγαγοῦσα αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς φυλέτας τοὺς ἐμοὺς παρενέγραψα καὶ 
ἀστὸν ἀπέφηνα, ὥστε τοὺς διαμαρτόντας τῆς ἐγγύης ἀποπνίγεσθαι. δόξαν δὲ 
αὐτῷ περινοστεῖν ἐπιδειξομένῳ τοῦ γάμου τὴν εὐποτμίαν, οὐδὲ τότε 
ἀπελείφθην, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ἑπομένη ἄνωκαὶ κάτω περιηγόμην: καὶ κλεινὸν 
αὐτὸν καὶ ἀοίδιμον ἐποίουν κατακοσμοῦσα καὶ περιστέλλουσα. καὶ τὰ μὲν 
ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας μέτρια, εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀποδημῆσαι 
θελήσαντι αὐτῷ τὸν Ἰόνιον συνδιέπλευσα καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα μέχρι τῆς 
Κελτικῆς συναπάρασα, εὐπορεῖσθαι ἐποίησα. (Bis Acc. 27) 
When this man, O Judges, was yet a teenager, still speaking with a foreign 
accent, and as it were still wearing a long middle-eastern robe, I came upon 
him traipsing around Ionia, not knowing what to do with himself; so I took 
hold of him and educated him. Since he seemed to me to be a good student, 
and meditated upon me with incessant care (for he was obedient to me then, 
attending upon me, and admiring none except me alone), I abandoned all 
others, as many as were suing for my hand, rich, handsome, and of noble 
birth though they were, and I betrothed myself to this ungrateful man, though 
he was poor, insignificant, and young, and I brought him no small dowry of 
many wonderful speeches. After I married him, I got him enrolled outside of 
usual custom among my own people, and made him a citizen, with the result 
that those had failed in their suit to marry me choked with jealousy.  When it 
seemed like a good idea to him to go travelling so as to show off the good 
fortune of his marriage, I did not desert him then, but I followed him up and 
down after him, being led everywhere, and I made him renowned and famous, 
adorning him and decking him out.  In Greece and Ionia, we had moderate 
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success; but when he desired to travel to Italy, I sailed across the Ionian sea 
with him, and ultimately went even as far as Gaul, where I made him to 
abound with prosperity.2 
The choice of metaphor is criticalin understanding the emotional connection which 
Lucian has for the art of rhetoric. Behind the humorous mood of the work lies 
something serious, in Lucian's essential mode of operating with σπουδαιογέλοιον, 
“serio-comicalness.” In the tenderness and plaintiveness of Lady Rhetoric's speech, we 
cannot but sense an earnest undertone of something we can only refer to as “love” for 
the art that formed the basis of Lucian's own identity and sense of self-worth (Dubel, 
1994, pp. 20-25; níMheallaigh, 2014, pp.175-176). Indicative, however, of both 
Lucian’s veneration for true rhetoric, and also his critique of the sophists of his day, is 
the ensuing section of the same dialogue. After acknowledging his debt to rhetoric for 
educating him and “enrolling him outside of usual custom” among the Greeks,“the 
Syrian” then describes how he left Lady Rhetoric because she had lost the comeliness 
of her pristine era, such as when Demosthenes lived, and, now, unfortunately, decks 
herself out like a prostitute, being courted by many arrogant and flattering lovers with 
whom she has adulterous affairs: 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ὁρῶν ταύτην οὐκέτι σωφρονοῦσαν οὐδὲ μένουσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ κοσμίου 
σχήματος οἷόν ποτε ἐσχηματισμένην αὐτὴν ὁ Παιανιεὺς ἐκεῖνος ἠγάγετο, 
κοσμουμένην δὲ καὶ τὰς τρίχας εὐθετίζουσαν εἰς τὸ ἑταιρικὸν καὶ φυκίον 
ἐντριβομένην καὶ τὠφθαλμὼ ὑπογραφομένην, ὑπώπτευον εὐθὺς καὶ 
παρεφύλαττον ὅποι τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν φέρει. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐῶ: καθ᾽ ἑκάστην 
δὲ τὴν νύκτα ὁ μὲν στενωπὸς ἡμῶν ἐνεπίμπλατο μεθυόντων ἐραστῶν 
κωμαζόντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ κοπτόντων τὴν θύραν, ἐνίων δὲ καὶ εἰσβιάζεσθαι 
σὺν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ τολμώντων. αὐτὴ δὲ ἐγέλα καὶ ἥδετο τοῖς δρωμένοις καὶ 
τὰ πολλὰ ἢ παρέκυπτεν ἀπὸ τοῦ. τέγους ᾀδόντων ἀκούουσα τραχείᾳ τῇ φωνῇ 
ᾠδάς τινας ἐρωτικὰς ἢ καὶ παρανοίγουσα τὰς θυρίδας ἐμὲ οἰομένη λανθάνειν 
ἠσέλγαινε καὶ ἐμοιχεύετο πρὸς αὐτῶν. (Bis Acc. 31) 
Seeing her no longer modest nor remaining in her pristine vesture, such as 
she was once arrayed in when Demosthenes took her to wife, but rather 
decking herself out and arranging hair like a prostitute, putting on make-up, 
and darkening her eyes underneath, I immediately became suspicious and 
guardedly observed where she directed her glances. I let the other things go, 
but every night our street was filled with drunken lovers coming to her, 
banging on the door, and at times even having the effrontery to force their 
way in stripped of all decency.  She herself laughed and took pleasure in 
these antics, often either peeping over the edge of the roof when she heard 
them singing odes in a rough voice, or else even furtively opening the 
windows, thinking to escape my notice, until at last she committed wanton 
adultery with them. 
Without over-stating the case, this seems to be a very accurate illustration of Lucian’s 
feelings towards many of the sophists of his day.They had violated the dear place 
which rhetorical art had obtained in his heart. But what, we may ask, is the precise 
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meaning of his metaphor here?  That is, what does it mean for one to be a flatterer and 
an adulterer of rhetoric?  In answer to this, there are three satires that are perhaps most 
illustrative of precisely what Lucian has in mind here, namely the 
RhetorumPraeceptor, the Pseudologista, and the Pseudosophista.  
In the first of these, we are presented with a caricature of a sophist (agreed by many to 
be Julius Pollux of Naucragis, the tutor of the future emperor Commodus), posing as a 
sophist in what can be properly called a “mock-protreptic” discourse, parodying 
genuine protreptic treatises which were designed to encourage young men to follow 
philosophy and virtue.  On the contrary, this “trainer of orators” is portrayed as 
shameless, effeminate (indeed, a passive homosexual [Rh. Pr. 24], the primary and 
long conventional insult utilised in literary invectives), and one wholly devoted merely 
to posing as an orator without having any real culture or intellectual substance. The 
third century sophist Philostratus, interestingly, even characterized Julius as one 
ἀπαίδευτος-πεπαιδευμένος—“a sophist with no sophistication” (VS 592).  He is the 
spokesman for the shortcut and easy road to eloquence, which can be traversed without 
all the difficulty of the conventional, rigorous training in rhetoric. Historically 
speaking, there does indeed seem to be truth behind this allegation that sophists of 
Lucian’s day promoted an abbreviated form of rhetorical education (Cribiore, 2007, p. 
83). “Simply pepper your speeches with fifteen or so Attic phrases,” says this Guide 
for the Easy Road to Eloquence, like “μῶν, λῷστε, and τᾷττα” (Rh. Pr. 16) and when 
you want to say something simple like “scraping-off” (ἀποξύσασθαι) use instead 
“destrigillation” (ἀποστλεγγίζεσθαι) (Rh. Pr. 17). Effrontery, ignorance, and temerity 
will be a solid foundation for your moral behavior, combined with total shamelessness.  
Wear dainty clothes, and intone your speeches in an almost sing-song fashion.  “Just 
make sure to always carry a book with you. This is sufficient for you to appear 
eloquent, and I will make you an orator before the sun sets” (Rh. Pr. 15).  Obviously, 
Lucian was disgusted at this sort of corruption and degeneracy of the lofty art of 
rhetoric, and such orators, we are to assume, were living examples of what he 
metaphorically referred to in the Bis Accusatus as the “flatterers” and “adulterers” of 
Lady Rhetoric. 
But in speaking of the specific issue of scattering one’s speeches with Attic phrases, 
another issue arises which Lucian satirizes in two different directions.  On the one 
hand, the use of barbarisms and solecisms, and on the other, the phenomenon 
sometimes referred to as “hyper-Atticism,” wherein the artificial use of words that had 
long since dropped out of use was employed by would-be orators with an almost 
fanatical tenacity.  In regard to the first of these, it must be noted that language purism 
arose as a reaction against the so-called koine dialect of Greek that had become, by the 
time of the Second Sophistic, a sign of “intellectual inadequacy” (Swain, 1996, p. 19), 
and Greek elites eschewed it as a way of differentiating themselves from the common 
people. Atticism gained momentum in the second and third centuries AD as koine 
Greek changed (partly through the influence of other languages in the culturally 
diffuse Roman empire) and became even more simplified (losing in time, for instance, 
the distinction between long and short vowels, the dual forms of nouns and verbs, as 
well as, ultimately, the dative case and the optative mood).  In this context, Lucian, 
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was a product of the conservative educational system that was the medium for 
maintaining Atticism and the cultural superiority which it represented. He pilloried, in 
works like Pseudologista and Pseudosophista, the use of barbarisms and solecisms 
that he hears used by unworthy sophists. In the first of these works, for instance, we 
are presented with a long and vicious list of such verbal infelicities made by a sophist 
undeserving of the name, which Lucian concludes by saying: 
εἶτα ἐν τοιούτοις ὄντι σοι ὀνομάτων μέλει καὶ γελᾷς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
καταπτύεις, εἰκότως: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντες ὅμοιά σοι λέγειν δυναίμεθα. πόθεν; 
τίς οὕτως ἐν λόγοις μεγαλότολμος, ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς τρεῖς μοιχοὺς ἀντὶ ξίφους 
τρίαιναν αἰτεῖν; τὸν δὲ Θεόπομπον ἐπὶ τῷ Τρικαράνῳ κρίνοντα φάναι 
τριγλώχινι λόγῳ καθῃρηκέναι αὐτὸν τὰς προὐχούσας πόλεις; καὶ πάλιν, 
ἐκτριαινῶσαι αὐτὸν τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ εἶναι Κέρβερον ἐντοῖς λόγοις; πρῴην 
γὰρ καὶ λύχνον ἅψας ἐζήτεις ἀδελφόν τινα, οἶμαι, ἀπολωλότα: καὶ ἄλλα 
μυρία, ὧν οὐδὲ μεμνῆσθαι ἄξιον, ἢ μόνου ἐκείνου, ὅπερ οἱ ἀκούσαντες 
ἀπεμνημόνευον. πλούσιός τις, οἶμαι, καὶ δύο πένητες ἦσαν ἐχθροί: εἶτα 
μεταξὺ περὶ τοῦ πλουσίου λέγων, ‘ἀπέκτεινεν,’ ἔφης, ‘θάτερον τῶν πενήτων.’ 
γελασάντων δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τῶν παρόντων, πανορθούμενος δὴ σὺ καὶ 
ἀνατιθέμενος τὸ διημαρτημένον, ‘οὐμὲν οὖν,’ ἔφης, ‘ἀλλὰ ἅτερον αὐτῶν 
ἀπέκτεινεν.’ ἐῶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα, τὸ τριῶν μηνοῖν καὶ τὸἀνηνεμία καὶ τὸ πέταμαι 
καὶ ἐκχύνειν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα καλὰ τοῖς σοῖς λόγοις ἐπανθεῖ. (Pseudol. 29) 
But there are countless other examples, which there is no point in even 
bringing up, except for that one which those that heard it had mentioned.  
Some wealthy individual, I gather, and two poor men were enemies. Then in 
the middle of the story, speaking about the wealthy individual, you said that, 
“he killed one of the two poor men” (using the incorrect form θάτερον instead 
of the proper τὸνἕτερον); and because those present were rightly laughing, 
you tried to fix it and undo your error by saying, “No, rather, he killed 
ἅτερον!”(another incorrect form for the proper Attic τὸνἕτερον).I'll pass over 
your other old howlers, such as your use of the dual when talking about three 
months, or your coinages like ἀνηνεμία (instead of νηνεμία for “lack of 
wind”), πέταμαι (instead ofπέτομαι for “I fly”), ἐκχύνειν (instead of ἐκχεῖν 
for “pouring out”), and all the many other beautiful things with which you 
embroider your speeches.3 
Lucian, however, was also aware that hyper-Atticism was likewise without virtue 
(Baldwin, 1973, pp. 41-59), and in his work Lexiphanes, he derides an orator who uses 
obsolete and recondite words simply because they are capable of being found buried in 
some classic author.  
ζητῶ οὖν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ὁπόθεν τὰ τοσαῦτα κακὰ συνελέξω καὶ ἐν ὁπόσῳ 
χρόνῳ καὶ ὅπου κατακλείσας εἶχες τοσοῦτον ἐσμὸν ἀτόπων καὶ διαστρόφων 
ὀνομάτων, ὧν τὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐποίησας, τὰ δὲ κατορωρυγμένα ποθὲν ἀνασπῶν. 
(Lex. 17) 
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I have been musing over from where, and for how long a span of time you  
must have  been collecting so much awful material, and wondering where you 
have locked up and kept such a hoard of absurd and distorted words, some of 
which you invented yourself, and others you dug-up from somewhere after 
they had been long buried.  
Lucian seems rather to have felt that a true orator should imitate Attic models only 
insofar as they were compatible with clarity of diction and modern usage, shunning 
obsolete words that were no longer readily understandable (indeed, not doing so was 
one of the canards thrown at the RhetorumPraeceptor). This is not to say, of course, 
that Lucian's common-sense nature did not have misgivings about the overly-pedantic 
elements of the old-fashioned model of rhetorical education either. In the same 
dialogue, for instance, the guide to the traditional path to eloquence tells students to 
follow in the footsteps of only a few classical authors “like a tight-rope walker” (Rh. 
Pr. 9), swerving not even a little lest he fall off the road and not “enter into a lawful 
marriage with Lady Rhetoric.” We are to understand Lucian, ever the pragmatist, 
finding the same fault here that he did with the hyper-Atticists, and denouncing 
anything that is too rigidly attached to superficial models, devoid of poignancy 
(Cribiore, 2007, p. 86). 
Similarly, with regard to subject matter, if we recall the fact that despite his love for 
the classical tradition, Lucian nevertheless composed a large portion of his corpus in a 
novel genre, the serio-comic philosophical dialogue, we can say that for him, 
originality and imitation of the ancients were absolutely compatible (Branham, 1985, 
p. 239; Fowler, 2017, p.570).  In this way, Lucian distinguishes himself as a writer 
with both stylistic taste and artistic judgment—characteristics of an author who took 
his rhetorical vocation seriously, and seems, in most respects, only to have satirized 
those orators whom he felt had disgraced the institution he held in such high regard. 
On a subtler level, however, we can also discern the great reverence which Lucian had 
for eloquence and for the rhetorical education he received by examining the modes of 
composition which he used in his works.  We can see this by the fact that his entire 
output is, to a greater or lesser extent, comprised of different components of the 
progymnasmata (Anderson, 1982, p. 61), that standard curriculum of rhetorical 
exercises ascending from the composition of a fable to a full-fledged declamation. 
These exercises provided not only the linguistic and literary content for the vast 
reservoir of images, phrases, and motifs that Lucian used, but also endowed him with 
conceptual frameworks for viewing topics and elaborating upon them. 
We see this immediately, for instance, with the second progymnasmatic exercise, the 
diegesis, or narration, which focused students’ attention on recounting events in 
sequence with an emphasis on the elements of circumstance (the “who,” “what,” 
“where,” “why,” “when,” and “how”).  Such narrations form the nucleus of many of 
Lucian's works, as varied in content as the Tyrranicida, the Symposium, and the Vera 
Historia. The diegesis also frequently appears as the major element in Lucian’s 
prolaliae, or introductory speeches given before main orations.  Such for instance, is 
the Prometheus Es with its narrative of Ptolemy bringing back an all-black camel and 
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a two-colored man (Prom. Es 4). Likewise the Herodotus offers an extended, self-
contained narrative about how Herodotus first won his fame by reading his histories at 
the Olympian Games. The Zeuxis, too, provides a full account of Antiochus’ 
unexpected victory with elephants over the Galatians. Furthermore, these last two 
pieces also exhibit the further progymnasmatic exercise of ekphrasis, or detailed 
description of a work of art, as Lucian consciously attempts to “bring his subject into 
sight through words” (Ael. Theon Progymnasmata 118:7-8), vibrantly portraying the 
images he describes (Zeitlin, 2013). 
Additionally, the progymnasmaticexercise of encomium makes many appearances in 
Lucian’s corpus.  In his Imagines and Pro Imaginibus, Lucian, praising the beauty and 
moral character of Emperor Lucius Verus’ courtesan, elaborates upon the nature of 
praise in contradistinction to flattery (κολακεία). He states that the difference lies in 
the fact that a flatterer simply lies, whereas one praising uses amplification (αὔξησις) 
of positive qualities. This is a mode of thought that would have been engendered in 
Lucian’s rhetorical training. 
A variation of the encomion that the rhetorical schools conventionally had students 
practice was the exercise known as adoxography, or praise of something or someone 
viewed as bad, or silly. Lucian accordingly furnishes us with examples of this, such as 
his Praise of the Fly. And the opposite type of progymnasmatic exercise to the 
enconium, the psogos, or invective, is clearly apparent in Lucian's work throughout his 
moral critique of the philosophers and sham-orators of his day. Sometimes a distinct 
way in which he uses invective is by combining it with yet another progymnasmatic 
exercise, the synkrisis, or comparison. The Rhetorum Praeceptoris a perfect example 
of this. All the typical categories of invective (like exposition of an individual's moral 
vice and bad character traits) are employed against a sham-sophist, but they are done 
so in dramatic contrast to the old, toilsome way of rhetorical education that Lucian 
himself had followed. Similarly, Lucian's Piscator also functions on this level of 
synkrisis, between philosophy as a pristine ideal, and the unworthy, contemporary 
representatives of it (though we shall see it is important not to take such assertions by 
Lucian at face value). 
In further discussing philosophy, one may also note the progymnastic exercise of the 
chreia, or exercise on a memorable statement, action, or combination of statement and 
action. With this rhetorical model in mind, Lucian wrote his life of the Cynically-
inclined philosopher Demonax almost entirely out of such chreiai. We see here a 
perfectly apt marriage of content and style in that Cynic rhetoric tended to be 
characterized by short, pithy expressions, as the Cynic lifestyle was also, at least 
ideally, one of unadornment and austerity (Bosman, 2012). Lucian’s training in the 
schools thus helped facilitate this literary/philosophical composition by endowing him 
with a ready and accessible literary medium, as well as a category of thought lying 
behind such a medium, which he could then employ and adapt to the purpose of 
succinctly portraying his subject. 
In sum, then, it would not be wrong to assert that there is no single work of Lucian's 
that does not bear the stamp of his rhetorical training. This can be seen through the 
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distinctive voices of the various speakers in his dialogues, the oratorical or mock-
oratorical delivery of his forensic pieces, the tone of vivid engagement with his subject 
which he employs in his descriptive works, or the carefully studied, relaxed attitude of 
a raconteur in his autobiographical moments (Hopkinson, 2008, p. 2). His literary-
rhetorical training functioned as a means of providing channels of thought and 
expression which a skilled orator like him could then rearrange, conflate, and turn into 
new entities to suit his purposes and to express himself individually. In connection 
with everything stated at the outset, Lucian so thoroughly possessed his training as a 
sophist, and valued it so highly, that he was motivated to direct his naturally keen wit 
against all those who would make a sham out of the single most fundamental thing 
upon which he based his whole sense of artistic identity and achievement. 
Philosophical Paideia 
Turning though to his critique of philosophy, a different picture emerges, and it must 
be stated at once that critique of the philosophers was not just limited to Lucian, but is 
widely found in the literature of his time. However, in Lucian’s works we see a 
complex picture, which, at first appearance may tempt one to deduce that, at the very 
least, by devoting so much attention to satirizing philosophy, Lucian must have taken 
its pursuit with enough seriousness so as to devote so much energy to mocking it.  But 
this would be misconceived, for such tremendous attention on Lucian’s part can also 
be explained in another way. Unlike in the era of a writer such asAristophanes, who 
clearly demonstrated a pronounced influence on Lucian, the position of the 
philosopher in the second century AD was very different. Not only was a smattering of 
philosophical culture helpful in promoting one’s status in society at this time, but, 
moreover, philosophy could be extremely lucrative, as philosophers were professional 
teachers that vied with each other and among sects to recruit (paying) students. Even 
the Emperor Marcus Aurelius himself endowed chairs of philosophy at Athens with 
official positions and enormous salaries. Philosophers were thus conspicuous members 
of society, and subsequently, to satirize them was not to mock marginal or enigmatic 
figures like Socrates, as Aristophanes had done, but it was rather to critique often 
bombastic professionals.They held positions in society that were as public as 
politicians, and made livings out of parading their daytime virtue while, as Lucian 
observed, often indulging in, and hiding, their nighttime vice. In a delightful passage 
of Lucian's Icaromenippus, the Moon describes precisely this phenomenon. 
καίτοι πόσα ἐγὼ συνεπίσταμαι αὐτοῖς ἃ πράττουσιτῶν νυκτῶν αἰσχρὰ καὶ 
κατάπτυστα οἱ μεθ’ ἡμέραν σκυθρωποὶ καὶ ἀνδρώδεις τὸ βλέμμα καὶ τὸ 
σχῆμα σεμνοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἀποβλεπόμενοι; κἀγὼ μὲν ταῦτα ὁρῶσα 
ὅμως σιωπῶ: οὐ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πρέπειν ἀποκαλύψαι καὶ διαφωτίσαι τὰς 
νυκτερινὰς ἐκείνας διατριβὰς καὶ τὸν ὑπὸ σκηνῆς ἑκάστου βίον ἀλλὰ κἄν 
τινα ἑκάστου βίον, ἴδω αὐτῶν μοιχεύοντα ἢ κλέπτοντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τολμῶντα 
νυκτερινώτατον, εὐθὺς ἐπισπασαμένη τὸ νέφος ἐνεκαλυψάμην, ἵνα μὴ δείξω 
τοῖς πολλοῖς γέροντας ἄνδρας βαθεῖ πώγωνι καὶ ἀρετῇ ἐνασχημονοῦντας. 
(Icar. 21) 
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Am I not privy to all the shameful and abominable things they do by night, 
who by day, with affected gravity, and manly look, are majestic in 
appearance, and the center of attention for the general public?  Even though 
I see these things, I hold my peace, for I do not consider it meet to uncover 
and bring to light those nocturnal pastimes, and the life of each behind the 
scenes. Rather, if I see anyone of them committing adultery, or stealing, or 
daring to do anything else in the dead of night,straight way I hide myself by 
pulling over a mass of clouds, so that I may not show to the common people 
aged men bringing shame on their long beards and on virtue. 
So, too, in Lucian's Symposium, a selection of all the schools of philosophy are each 
shown to be absurd parodies of their schools’ teachings.There, an honor-loving Stoic 
steals food from the table and demonstrates irascible anger;an Epicurean, though 
disavowing that the gods hear prayers or exercise providence over the earth, 
nevertheless holds a public priesthood;a Cynic, supposedly devoted to austerity and 
the simple life, gorges himself with food and drink; and a Platonist, after beginning to 
describe Plato’s critique of monogamy in support of common wives, proclaims 
pederasty to be more virtuous than marriage (and this at a wedding feast!). Thus is 
represented one of the major themes of Lucian’s satire against the philosophers: 
hypocrisy, and the failure of philosophers to live up to the teachings of their doctrines. 
But to view Lucian’s critique of philosophical culture only in this way would be to 
suggest that Lucian esteemed philosophy in principle, yet mocked its unworthy 
proponents.  This at first glance would seem to be analogous to how he critiqued 
rhetoricians out of implicit respect for the dignity of eloquence. Indeed, this is the 
argument that he, through the mask of Parresiades, makes before the resurrected 
philosophers in his work the Piscator: 
κἀπειδὴ μόνον παρέκυψα εἰς τὰ ὑμέτερα, σὲ μέν, ὥσπερ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, καὶ 
τούσδε ἅπαντας ἐθαύμαζον ἀρίστου βίου νομοθέτας ὄντας καὶ τοῖς ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν 
ἐπειγομένοις χεῖρα ὀρέγοντας, τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ συμφορώτατα παραινοῦντας, 
εἴ τις μὴ παραβαίνοι αὐτὰ μηδὲ διολισθάνοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτενὲς ἀποβλέπων εἰς τοὺς 
κανόνας οὓς προτεθείκατε, πρὸς τούτους ῥυθμίζοι καὶ ἀπευθύνοι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ 
βίον, ὅπερ νὴ Δία καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ὑμᾶςαὐτοὺς ὀλίγοι ποιοῦσιν.ὁρῶν δὲ πολλοὺς 
οὐκ ἔρωτι φιλοσοφίας ἐχομένους ἀλλὰ δόξης μόνον τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦπράγματος 
ἐφιεμένους, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρόχειρα ταῦτα καὶ δημόσια καὶ ὁπόσα 
παντὶμιμεῖσθαι ῥᾴδιον εὖ μάλα ἐοικότας ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, τὸ γένειον λέγω 
καὶ τὸ βάδισμα καὶ τὴν ἀναβολήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀντιφθεγγομένους τῷ σχήματι καὶτἀναντία ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδεύοντας καὶ 
διαφθείροντας τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ὑποσχέσεως, ἠγανάκτουν. (Pisc. 30-31) 
For when I glimpsed your (Philosophy’s) principles, I marveled, as it was 
necessary, and also at such men being law-givers of the best life, stretching 
out a hand to those pushing onwards this goal. But then, seeing many not 
with a love of philosophy, but only of the honor coming from appearances, 
seeming like good men in respect to the convenient and public things, such as 
are easy for all to imitate (I mean a beard, and gait, and mantle), but denying 
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them in the pattern of their lives and deeds, both pursuing their opposites and 
corrupting the worthiness of their vow, I became angry. 
Such is Lucian’s defense: I honor philosophy, and respect “all these men” (meaning 
Socrates, and Plato, and Diogenes, and all the rest of the great philosophers), but I was 
vexed at their unworthy followers. The problem, however, with such a defense it that it 
totally ignores the actual evidence in the Vitarum Auctio, which precipitated the 
Piscator and for which the Piscator is an apologia. There, the very philosophers 
themselves are named in the headings and are held up for ridicule. Even if one 
suspects these headings as possibly being a later addition, the point still stands, since 
the characters are often unambiguously identified with the actual philosophers— 
Diogenes is “the dirty one from the Black Sea,” Heraclitus is “the man from Ephesus 
who cries,” and so on. Moreover, there is, as Hall (1981) has pointed out, not one 
mention of the worthiness of the original philosophers, or even of philosophy itself, in 
contradistinction to contemporary hypocritical disciples (p. 156). Indeed, most of the 
major philosophies from antiquity, from Aristotelianism, to Cynicism, 
Pythagoreanism, Stoicism, Skepticism, and many other individual philosophers are all 
held up to be in and of themselves silly, esoteric, and ultimately totally unnecessary 
(Bragues, 2004, p. 227; Pinheiro, 2015, pp. 74-79). 
Therefore, we can gain a better picture of the distinct lack of credence which Lucian 
had in philosophy qua philosophy, even aside from its pretensions and hypocrisy, by 
looking at two particular works: the Necyomantia, and the Hermotimus.  In the first, 
Menippus asks the blind prophet Tiresias what is the best sort of life for mortals: 
 
‘Ὦ τέκνον,’ φησί, ‘τήν μὲν αἰτίαν οἶδά σοι τῆς ἀπορίας ὅτι παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν 
ἐγένετο οὐ ταὐτὰ γιγνωσκόντων ἑαυτοῖς...‘ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἄριστος βίος, καὶ 
σωφρονέστερος παυσάμενος τοῦ μετεωρολογεῖν καὶ τέλη καὶ ἀρχὰς 
ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ καταπτύσας τῶν σοφῶν τούτων συλλογισμῶν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 
λῆρον ἡγησάμενος τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἅπαντος θηράσῃ, ὅπως τὸ παρὸν εὖ 
θέμενος παραδράμῃς γελῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ μηδὲν ἐσπουδακώς.’ (Nec. 21) 
He said: My son, I know the reason for your perplexity; it came from the wise 
men who are not consistent with themselves...But the life of the common sort 
is best, and you will act more wisely if you cease from the mindlessness of 
discussing high things, and looking into final and first causes. But having spit 
upon the syllogisms of these wise men, and considering such things nonsense, 
may you pursue this alone from everything: that being well-disposed to your 
circumstance, you run through life laughing at many things, and being 
serious about nothing. 
A stronger indictment not just of philosophers, but of philosophy itself could scarcely 
be imagined, since it has been by philosophy that Menippus is here confused and lost, 
perplexed as to what the greatest good for man is — the primary question, that is, of 
all philosophical ethics. Only by spitting one's scorn on such pursuits does the answer 
to life's summum bonum appear. 
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Similarly, in the Hermotimus, the longest, and one of the most serious in tone of all 
Lucian's works, we are presented with one reason after another for why a person 
should not bother studying philosophy, frittering away precious time, not in practicing 
virtue, but merely splitting hairs in logic and wrangling over insoluble problems.  “But 
you have not realized this, I suppose,” Lucian says, through his favorite mask of 
Lycinus,“that virtue is in deeds, to do the sort of things as are just, and wise, and 
courageous” (Hermot. 79). It is true that throughout the course of the Hermotimus (and 
in other works too, such as the VitarumAuctio), Lucian clearly shows a familiarity with 
the doctrines of the different schools. Nevertheless, this alone is not sufficient 
evidence for us to believe that he made a “long search” for philosophy (as we have 
already seen those sections of the Piscator in which he said he did cannot be taken at 
face value). Rather, it would be striking if an educated Greek of the second century, 
who had gone through all three stages of rhetorical training (and no doubt something 
beyond that), did not have some knowledge of the different philosophical schools. 
Ultimately, therefore, Lucian’s philosophical position seems to be one of practicality, 
as exemplified both by these lines from the Hermotimus, and perhaps most vividly by 
one of the few philosophical figures whom he does not in the least ridicule, Demonax. 
As an historical figure Demonax remains obscure, though there has been recent work 
on non-Lucianic sources for his life and thought, along with a collection of some new 
fragments (Searby, 2008, pp. 120-147).  Nevertheless, one thing which comes across 
strikingly from Lucian's account, and which Lucian himself emphasizes, is that 
Demonax eschewed direct affiliation with any philosophical sect.  At times, he seems 
to have the most in common with the Cynic school (“resembling in his dress the man 
from Sinope,” as Lucian states (Demon. 5), by which of course he means Diogenes the 
founder of Cynic philosophy). But even here it is clear that he was no doctrinaire 
adherent to any one particular philosophical code (Demon. 62), but rather was in 
general an enemy to any dogma (Whitmarsh, 2015, p. 221). In the final analysis, what 
Lucian found most impressive about him was that he spent his almost one hundred 
years of life in simplicity, cheerfulness, and kindness. It was his deeds, and not any 
speculative fussing about that made him admirable. 
With this, it is fitting to close with a passage from The Downward Journey.  In it, the 
(presumably) fictitious Cynic philosopher Cynicus is about to be carried across the 
river Styx, but must first present his bare soul for judgment (for, as he is told, whatever 
of evil has been done in life appears as a branding on the soul).  Yet he is found to be 
altogether clean, except for three or four marks that are dim, although there are many 
indications of brandings that have been removed. To this he says, “for a long time, 
being an evil man through lack of education (δι’ἀπαιδευσίαν), and having earned 
many brandings on account of this, I at once began to practice philosophy, and in a 
little while, I cleansed all these defilements from my soul” (Cat. 24).Thus with these 
words Lucian, though often satirizing even the very ideals of philosophy,nevertheless 
gives great insight into them, and, as ever, he returns to the practical: it is in this regard 
only that philosophy can have any possible value at all, if it makes a person genuinely 
better. 




In conclusion, all of what we have said regarding Lucian's perspective on philosophy 
seems to have been most succinctly put long ago, in the ninth century by Patriarch 
Photius of Constantinople, whose Bibliotheca has proven to be such a treasure trove 
for philologists. He observed that, “although mocking and making fun of others' 
opinions, Lucian does not lay down what he himself believes, except perhaps if 
someone were to say that his system of belief is to have no system of belief” (Henry, 
1967, codex 128, Vol. 2, p. 102: τὰς γὰρ ἄλλων κωμῳδῶν καὶ διαπαίζων δόξας, αὐτὸς 
ἥν θειάζει οὐ τίθησι, πλὴν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ δόξαν ἐρεῖ τὸ μηδὲν δοξάζειν). Living 
virtuously without hypocrisy, abiding by the dictates of common sense, and, most of 
all, feeling the joy of laughter, were, in his view, the most important things for a 
human being. Such a mixture of serious and comical elements might have seemed 
most germane to the Cynic approach towards philosophy, in the style of the school's 
founder Diogenes.It is because of this overlap that a few exemptions from his general 
mockery directed towards the other schools are granted to particular Cynics.  But even 
here he is not consistent, nor are all his works marked by a Cynic tone. In the 
VitarumAuctiohe describes Cynic philosophy with words reminiscent of those with 
which he characterized the fraudulent RhetorumPraeceptor, as a “short cut” (ἐπίτομος 
ὁδός) for uneducated and shameless people towards fame (Vit. Auct. 11).One must 
also recall the scathing attacks Lucian makes against such individual Cynics as 
Peregrinus, and many others.  Thus Lucian was no thorough-going member of the 
Cynic, or any other school (Bosman, 2012, pp.787-793). Rather, the one truly 
consistent element of all his works lies in the imprint of his rhetorical training and his 
urbane Attic style, deployed in the various types of writing and expression which he 
learned in his education through the progymnasmata. It is this rhetorical art which in 
his heart of hearts he held most dear, the key to his life's success, the chariot by which 
he outsoared his contemporaries, and the one thing which he treated with unalloyed 
seriousness. 
Notes 
1. Richter (2017, p. 328) goes too far, however, in categorically rejecting any 
overlap at all between the speaking personae of Lucian’s texts and the author 
himself. 
2. All translations from the Greek here and throughout are mine. 
3. I am indebted to A.M. Harmon [1936 vol. 5, p. 409] for the explanation of these 
rather easy to miss, linguistic jokes. 
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